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Susan Halford & Mike Savage
RECONCEPTUALIZING DIGITAL
SOCIAL INEQUALITY
This paper discusses conceptual tools which might allow an elaborated sociological
analysis of the relationship between information and communication technology on
the one hand, and social inequalities on the other. The authors seek to go beyond the
familiar idea of the ‘digital divide’ to develop a focus on digital social inequality,
through discussing three bodies of literature which are normally not discussed
together. The paper thus addresses issues in feminist theory; the sociological field
analysis of Pierre Bourdieu; and the Actor Network Theory. This paper shows
that there are unexpected commonalities in these three perspectives which allow
the possibility of effective cross-fertilization. All seek to avoid positing the existence
of reified social groups which are held separate from technological forces, and all
stress the role of fluid forms of relationality, from which social inequalities can
emerge as forms of stabilization, accumulation and convertibility.
Keywords sociology; social theory; digital divide
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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that digital information and communication technologies
(ICTs) are implicated in social inequalities associated with class, gender, race,
ethnicity and age (among others). However, there are currently only limited,
even restrictive, ways of exploring this interface analytically. In particular, the
most influential account – that of the digital divide – separates technology, on
the one hand, and social process, on the other. Inequality retains an independent
dynamic which technology, as a separate phenomenon, may be related to.
Furthermore, the notion of ‘the digital divide’ tends to imply a simple and
singular boundary between the digitally engaged and those who are disengaged
which glosses the possibility of more complex processes of stratification. At the
same time – beyond debates about the digital divide – most sociological analyses
of stratification separate social inequalities from technical processes. This remains
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true even in recent ‘cultural class analysis’ which develops a subtle and complex
account of class identities but has not – to date – related these to technical
capacities and affordances, despite the ubiquity of ICT in key aspects of
contemporary everyday life. Meanwhile, although science and technology studies
(STS) suggests some important conceptual and theoretical resources for exploring
socio-technical relations, so far, these have been developed largely as a critique of
‘mainstream’ sociological concerns with class, gender, race and other forms of
inequality (see the discussion in Law 2008). Indeed, Latour (2005) (and others)
take particular issue with the ‘sociological aggregates’ (class, gender, etc.) that
have pre-occupied sociology and promotes instead an ‘associational sociology’, ela-
borated through the Actor Network Theory (ANT), which denies any a priori
assumptions about the existence of social categories or aggregates.
In sum, there has been a serious disconnection – and even some outright
hostility1 – between forms of analysis which surely need to be in dialogue if we
are to grasp the nature of relations between ICT and inequality. The aim of this
special issue of Information, Communication & Society is to open up a space for
more fruitful exchange between theoretical approaches which – we suggest
–will allow us to explore ‘digital social inequality’ more adequately. The papers
in this issue offer a variety of innovative approaches to this task but are united
in their commitment to developing more complex awareness of the dynamic pro-
cesses of social differentiation and classification linked to digital technologies. Our
aim in this introductory paper is to sketch our own route through the theoretical
issues and possibilities for theoretical development, as we see them. We begin with
a necessarily brief overview of existing research on the digital divide. This clearly
indicates that the internet and the web are related to social inequality in important
ways but that we need better understandings of the processes that link them. To
develop these understandings, further theoretical work is required. To do this, we
draw first on feminist approaches to science and technology, which currently offer
the most sophisticated debate in this area. We then take the unusual path of
suggesting that Bourdieu’s field analysis, and more particularly his concept of
technical capital, has the potential to add to feminist accounts by developing our
understanding of the processes of accumulation and transmission of assets,
including technical assets, in the making of difference and inequality. However,
as it stands, we note that this concept is underdeveloped and tends towards an
overly instrumental account of both technology and social agency. Here, we
suggest that ANT may allow us to extend our analysis.
In elaborating these issues, we also contextualize the papers included in this
special issue. Each of these takes up the challenge for improved understandings of
digital social inequality in its own way. Some dig deeper into particular questions
of gender and/or race (see Gilbert, pp. 1000–1018, Kvasny et al., pp. 1040–
1061 and Kirkpatrick, pp. 976–999) while others focus on particular fields of
practice, specifically healthcare (Andreassen & Dyb, pp. 956–975) and demo-
cratic participation (Zhang, pp. 1019–1039) to explore ways of conceptualising
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relations between technology and inequality. To do so, a range of theoretical
resources are brought into play from feminist theory to dance theory, political
theory, ANT and Bourdieusian concepts of capital. Taken together, we hope
that these papers open up the terrain for thinking about digital social inequalities
in new and exciting ways, which we hope that will contribute to the shaping of
research agendas for the future.
2. From digital divide to digital social inequality
We know that there is differential access to the internet both within and between
nations. The stark fact is that the majority of the world’s citizens – still – do not
have access to the internet and this is clearly associated with inequalities of
income and class, gender, race and age (see, e.g. DiMaggio et al. 2001; National
Telecommunications and Information Administration [NTIA] 2004; Department
for Communities and Local Government 2008) often in compound forms, not
least for citizens of developing nations. This lack of access has been understood
as a form of social exclusion, reproducing or even exacerbating, the social
inequalities that produce it, as those without access are (increasingly) denied
information, for example about jobs, healthcare or welfare, and miss out on
new opportunities for political engagement, social networking and consumption.
In this formulation, then, digital ICTs are positioned as a neutral good, access to
which can be converted into ‘other valued goods services and life outcomes’
(DiMaggio et al. 2001, p. 312). Accordingly, policy interventions often imply
that, somehow, access to the internet will transform life chances.
Yet, there is now important research which shows that access per se does not
confer equal advantages to the users of ICT (Lawson-Mack 2001; Warschauer
2004; Hargittai 2008) and that we need to focus our attention on questions of
practice. One way of rendering this (in economistic fashion perhaps) is to say
that there are inequalities in returns from gaining access to ICT (DiMaggio &
Hargittai 2001). Hargittai (2008) formulates this as follows:
A refined approach to digital inequality recognises that people’s socio-
economic status influences the ways in which they have access to and use
the internet.
(p. 939, emphasis added)
Since, she suggests, ‘some uses are more likely to yield beneficial outcomes than
others’ (p. 940), it is also necessary to trace whether there is a ‘loopback’ from
use to socio-economic position and, if so, ‘what are the processes through which
. . . uses of ICT may privilege some users over others’ (Hargittai 2008). Here
‘processes’ refers to the different kinds of internet use that give greater or
lesser access to ‘the types of assets, resources, and valued goods that underlie
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stratification systems’ (p. 940). The suggestion is that certain types of use increase
access to ‘human capital, financial capital, social capital and cultural capital, while
other types of use may downright disadvantage the uninformed’ (Hargittai 2008).
The critical distinction lies in possession of the appropriate resources to enable
informed, effective and secure use of ICTs including, for example, the skills to
navigate the quality and quantity of information available effectively, to make enter-
prising use of information, to protect oneself from fraud and other potential harms
and to use the knowledge and information accessed via the internet as a marker of
social status. The acquisition and possession of these skills is not conceived in solely
individual terms, but is connected to wider processes both in terms of pre-existing
social inequalities (for example, inequalities of education (Robinson et al. 2003),
race (Lawson-Mack 2001), place (Gilbert et al. 2008)) and in terms of the contexts
of use (whether educational, institutional or policy/political) that may support or
inhibit ‘meaningful social use’ (Warschauer 2004, p. 34). Thus, as Lawson-Mack
(2001) argues, we need to have a good understanding of the contexts in which
technologies operate, including social-structural relations, institutional and
organizational practices, in order to understand how to overcome inequalities of
use. For Lawson-Mack (2001):
The overall policy challenge is not to overcome a digital divide but rather to
expand access to and use of ICT for promoting social inclusion.
(Lawson-Mack 2001, p. 212, emphasis added)
The message, then, is that the transformational potential of ICT requires capacity
building to overcome the effects of other, independent, structural sources of
disadvantage.
This more ‘refined’ approach emphasizes that there are more or less effec-
tive uses of ICT and in doing so, takes an important step forward in our thinking
about the differential use of technology, rather than access per se. However, there
are two interconnected problems with the revised account, as we have described
it so far. First, it continues – largely2 – to position ICT as a neutral good and is
based on assumptions about ‘rational’ or ‘normal’ use of the internet/web to
which we should all aspire. This tends towards fixing technology as if it has
pre-determined or set capacities and affordances that are knowable in advance.
At the same time, it assumes an input–output model, where the social input
– race, for example – shapes how technologies are used, which in turn
shapes output, most likely (in this example) the reproduction of racial inequality.
In other words, particular technologies (here the web) and inequality are taken as
independent entities which may or may not impact on each other, but there is no
attention to the processes which link them together or the ways in which each
might shape what the other becomes. To the contrary, we suggest that we must
explore, for example, how classed processes shape what the web becomes as well
as how the web might shape what class means. As Lawson-Mack (2001)
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concludes, we must explore the ‘. . . complex and mutually evolving relationship
between a technology and broader social structures’ (p. 202, emphasis added).
To take this forward, we turn first to feminist debates of technology which
highlight the ways that technologies themselves are implicated in the very consti-
tution of gender differentiation and inequality.
3. The co-constitution of technology and gender
The place of technology in shaping and maintaining gender differentiation and
inequality has long been debated by feminist scholars and activists (see Faulkner
(2001) and Wajcman (2004, 2007) for excellent reviews). In these debates, we
find some echoes of our discussion above about the limits to concepts of the
digital divide. For example, policies promoting science and engineering edu-
cation for girls and women – to ensure inclusion and therefore, it is assumed,
equality – have been critiqued for their conceptualization of technology as fun-
damentally neutral (Wajcman 2007). Indeed, it is argued, the limited success of
these programmes is explained by the failure to conceptualize technology itself
and to get to grips with more embedded relations between science, masculinity
and male power (Henwood 2000; Faulkner 2001). Specifically, the argument
runs, the problem is not simply a question of access to a neutral set of skills,
practices and opportunities but – rather – that science and technology are pro-
duced by, and constitutive of, masculine identities and male power. This kind of
claim has been the subject of much debate within feminist theory, which has
taken issue with essentialized conceptualizations of gender, whereby fixed attri-
butes and identities are attached to ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as if these are objective
and static categories, and this is a point taken up by Kirkpatrick later in this issue,
in his provocative exploration of the gendering of computer games. Nonetheless,
in more sophisticated claims, the broad argument persists that science and tech-
nology have emerged in ways that ally them with masculinity – albeit not in any
fixed or pre-determined way – and that this will persist unless and until there is a
fundamental shift in the power relations that produce the forms of scientific
practice, technology design, control and management of technology, and so
on, whether women have access to science and technology, or not.
Some have claimed that the emergence of the internet and specifically the web
may mark such a fundamental shift. Specifically, it has been argued that ubiquity
and (relative) ease of access to the web offers virtual possibilities for the establish-
ment of radical new expressions of identity, forms of social relations, free from the
binary distinctions of human/machine, male/female that characterize life off-line
(Plant 1998). Famously, Haraway (1991, 1997) has urged us to embrace these
new cyborg possibilities – new hybrid worlds, part-machine, part-human –
and their potential to take us beyond essentialized categorizations of gender
difference embedded in earlier feminist theory. This said, at a basic level,
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cyberfeminist arguments such as these may present their own form of technological
essentialism in which the internet and web are accorded a fixed – in this case
liberatory – meaning and value, and deterministic assumptions are made about
the effects of such technologies (Wajcman 2007). This universal and positive scen-
ario leaves questions about the exploitative and oppressive iterations of web use
and functionality – the spread of internet porn and cybercrime, for instance –
as well as the pervasiveness of older forms of inequality – race, for example
– in cyberspace and virtual worlds (Back 2002; Nakamura 2007). Furthermore,
to treat ‘the web’ as a single technology with singular and specific outcomes is to
deny the complexity of applications, uses and relations made in the human-
technology interactions of everyday life on the world wide web. Surfing e-Bay
is qualitatively different in terms of skill, status and reward to editing Wikipedia
or running a web-design business.
In this context, Wajcman (2004, 2007) makes the argument for a ‘third way’
that avoids both the gender and the technological essentialism of earlier perspectives.
While keeping the proposition that gender and technology may be co-constitutive –
that each is implicated in making the other – she insists that we pay attention to the
fluidity and flexibility with which these co-constitutions emerge. With this prop-
osition, we are able to understand gender–technology relations as both ‘contin-
gently stabilized and contestable’ (Wajcman 2007, p. 294): to explore the
repetitive and entrenched inequalities as well as the fluid and unstable relations
that may neutralize, invalidate or weaken gender inequalities in particular contexts.
In other words, Wajcman (2007) argues that the outcomes particular technologies-
in-use cannot be ‘read off from fixed sets of power relations’. Rather, that what a
technology becomes and how relations with gender emerge are neither fixed nor
independent, but performative and relational.
This account has much in common with the more general direction of travel
that feminist theory has taken in recent years, not least the insistence that
gender is something that we ‘do’ rather than something that we ‘have’. Of
course, this is not simply a matter of free choice. Rather, as Judith Butler
argues, gender is performative within powerful regulatory norms and – in turn
– through the repeated citation of these norms, gender identity is reproduced as
a naturalized and entrenched power structure (Campbell & Harbord 1999;
Butler 2004). However, as Butler (2004) also argues, this should not blind us to
the think-ability of disrupting the entrenched binaries of masculinity and femininity,
to possibilities for alternative expressions of gender. At the same time, we should be
attentive to the times and places where gender may have limited relevance or not be
relevant at all (Lorentzen & Muhleisen 2006). Similarly, in avoiding technological
determinism, we should not conceptualize technology as simply a free choice, only
socially constructed with infinite potential for interpretive flexibility (cf. Pinch &
Bijker 1989) and we return to this point shortly in our discussion of ANT.
For now, in sum, the emphasis here is on the relationality of gender and tech-
nology and the contingency of outcomes while – at the same time – allowing
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for us to be attentive to potential for (at least temporary) stabilization of relation
between gender and technology, such that they might come to be seen as normal or
even natural. We suggest that this theoretical proposition might also apply to other
forms of inequality and, indeed, to inter-sectionalities whereby apparently distinct
forms of inequality, e.g. gender and race, become bound with each other and – in
this case – with technologies. However, while this is a useful framework, it offers
few conceptual tools with which to explore how particular configurations emerge
in practice (Faulkner 2001; Wajcman 2007). In what follows we suggest that we
might develop some useful concepts by drawing first on recent debates about stra-
tification and second on ANT. In seeking to conceptually elaborate these concerns,
we explore these two literatures in turn, seeking to show certain symmetries
across their rather different conceptual vocabularies.
4. Capitals, assets and resources
In recent years, there has been growing conceptual interest in how social
inequalities can be understood in relation to forms of social and cultural
‘capital’, as popularized by theorists such as Putnam (2000), Bourdieu (1985)
and Coleman (1991). This work is controversial, since it is sometimes seen as
relying on an economic logic in which capital is a device for securing instrumen-
tal advantage, and hence can be seen as complicit with theories of the digital
divide which we have criticized above. However, before endorsing this critique,
it is important to understand why this theorising has proven attractive to
researchers of stratification. In place of the large scale, unwieldy mobilization
of social categories, embedded – for instance – in concepts of the ‘class struc-
ture’, or ‘patriarchy’, it is more concerned with the contexts in which capitals
can operate and hence can be more interested in the mutable and contested ways
by which capitals are both formed and become operational. Or to put this even
more simply, it marks an increasing interest in the micro, rather than macro
dynamics of social inequality, which is a terrain closer to the feminist arguments
discussed previously.
It is helpful to delineate the three distinctively different ways in which the
notion of capital is deployed in this body of work (see more generally, Savage
et al. 2005). For American ‘mainstream’ sociologists such as James Coleman,
the concept is embedded in a rational choice perspective, in which the possession
of capital allows individuals to gain advantage over others. This is rather similar
to the perspective which has been deployed by proponents of the digital divide.
The problem with this account is a tendency to tautology, in which anything
which bestows advantage can be called a form of ‘capital’ (Devine 2004).
A second perspective has been deployed within Marxist analyses of
exploitation, notably by Wright (1985; see the subsequent debate in Wright
(1996) and Crompton et al. (2000)). Whereas Marxist theories of class had
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previously relied on the labour theory of value (in which surplus value was
deemed to be extracted from productive labourers), Wright argued that
exploitation could better be defined using the terms of game theory, in
which those with certain assets (organizational, economic and skill) exploited
those without them (see the discussion in Savage et al. 1992). The problem
with this perspective is that axes of exploitation proliferate as it becomes poss-
ible to identify numerous assets which bestow differential advantage (e.g. right-
handedness, the ability to drive cars and so on). Wright himself seeks to rein in
this tendency in a rather unsatisfactory way by positing – arbitrarily, given that
he has dispensed with the labour theory of value – that only assets linked to
employment can be deemed as forms of exploitation. The result is conceptual
fudge that has disabled this perspective from extensive empirical elaboration in
recent years.
A third possibility, in our view more productive, is Bourdieu’s conceptual-
ization of capital, which has been taken up in different ways by several of our
contributors (see papers by Gilbert, Kvasny et al. and Zhang, this issue) who
show the potential for the concept to be developed in ways that elaborate sen-
sitivity towards the in-egalitarian aspects of ICT. For Bourdieu, capitals are forms
of asset – economic, social or cultural – understood to operate within fields,
which are seen as (semi-) autonomous arenas of social life. Thus, music can
be conceived as a field if both producers and consumers of music identify differ-
ent genres and artists as competing with each other for relative position and
advantage (see more generally, Bennett et al. 2009). Bourdieu’s elaboration of
this argument offers one way forward for operationalizing our concerns with
the relationality and stabilization, which we have discussed above. Specifically,
his general approach to the study of inequality repudiates the idea of pre-defining
social groups (such as social classes) as bounded entities, focusing instead on how
boundaries are themselves constructed and mobilized. The notion of ‘capital’ is
critical here, because it moves us away from the idea of fixed advantages associ-
ated with pre-defined groups and focuses instead on ‘the set of actually usable
resources and powers’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. 122) that can be mobilized to
achieve advantage and classify social distinctions (Weininger 2004). These capi-
tals are only effective within contexts – or fields – that allow them to be accu-
mulated. Thus, rather than depending on a notion of exploitation, as Wright
does, for Bourdieu, assets can be defined in terms of their scope for allowing
accumulation. This can take two forms. First, it can involve the accentuation of
given advantages within any specific field – for example, as capitalists can
accumulate more money through investment (hence, emphasising its autonomy
over other fields). Secondly, it can take the form of converting an advantage in
one field into advantages in other fields – for example, as a successful artist
opens up an art gallery business – through a process of convertibility (hence,
involving heteronomy between fields). This approach re-conceptualizes capital
not as an entity in its own right, the possession of which allows certain people
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to gain advantages over others, but as a process which allows the storing and
accumulation of advantage.
We think that this perspective might assist an analysis of the relationship
between technology and inequality. Certainly, it avoids the problematic logic
of arguments about capital that are based on exploitation (e.g. Wright, above)
since it is no longer necessary to focus on whether those with technical skills
exploit those without them, something would it be difficult to demonstrate.
Nor does it involve the claim that access to technical skills in and of itself
necessarily conveys advantage. It is the access to contexts in which these can
be used effectively that is important. At the same time, this approach does
allow us to explore how technical skills might allow the accumulation of other
capacities – for instance, in terms of reputation among peers, and also the
potential to convert these skills into other areas – for instance, in the labour
market or political participation. In short, this approach allows a non-dogmatic
framework that does not seek to define inequalities in categorical terms
(where one predefined social group is held to exploit or gain advantage over
another predefined group) and offers a context specific awareness of how advan-
taged social position is generated through the accumulation of particular
resources and capacities.
Of course, Bourdieu’s substantive focus is on economic, social and cultural
forms of capital and he does not address the role of technology in any detail.
Nonetheless, in On the Social Structures of the Economy (Bourdieu 1986), he does
introduce the notion of ‘technical capital’ as a sub-set of cultural capital. For
Bourdieu, this is rather a specific notion used to explore how skilled manual
workers were able to deploy their distinctive technical resources to gain
certain kinds of advantage, as Bennett et al. (2009, p. 206) explain:
The most affluent, the most male, the whitest, and the most British section
of the working class, with the strongest sense of class identity and working-
class political affiliation, the lower technicians look very much like the rem-
nants of the traditional, skilled, male working class that had provided the
labour movement with much of its core support and a good deal of its indus-
trial leadership. Their resources are perhaps best described as consisting in a
stock of ‘technical capital’ comprising both vocational qualifications and
technical forms of ‘know how’ acquired through a mixture of schooling
and the acquisition of technical skills once transmitted as a form of capital
from father to son.
Thus, while Bourdieu’s arguments about technical capital here are suggestive,
they cannot be simply translated into thinking about digital social inequality.
Specifically, Bourdieu sees technical capital as akin to traditional handicraft
skills, whereby a ‘labour aristocracy’ accrues advantages over less-skilled
workers. He does not elaborate on the overlap between these skills and forms
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of masculine power, although – as has been shown by feminist researchers (e.g.
Cockburn 1981) – this is an important question. Furthermore, this definition of
technical capital is not obviously appropriate for ICT, given its distributed and
networked capacity (in which skills cannot be possessed individually but are
co-produced through the involvement of numerous other players, gamers and
associates, and their devices).
Clearly, it is necessary to move beyond the conceptualization of technical
capital as a residue from the handicraft skills of a previous historical formation.
Furthermore, as the feminist critique of skill has demonstrated, some tasks
requiring technical skills, such as cooking or domestic work, may not
command resources in any obvious way and we need to be alive to the way
that the capacity of technical capital to convey advantage depends on the contex-
tual dynamic. When technologies become ubiquitous, they stop being a source of
capital. However, we want to avoid a logic which suggests that technical capital is
simply another form of social closure, in which assets can only be claimed to be
forms of technological capital when certain kinds of barriers are put in place to
prevent widespread use. Such a reading would draw us back towards the rational
choice framings which we have criticized above. Furthermore, it has been shown
that only in rare cases are clear social barriers to skill acquisition put in place –
notably in certain skilled manual trades, such as in the nineteenth century print-
ing industry. In such situations, a given technology itself does not exclude others,
but institutional regulations (notably regarding apprenticeship) can prevent
people from learning to use it.
We would suggest that it is more common for actual technological forms to
differentiate between people according to their capacity (itself the product of
myriad factors) to use them and, furthermore, that uses can be unpredictable
and/or produce unintended outcomes (see Andreassen & Dyb, this issue). The
ability to deploy technological capacities – to make technology perform –
requires an analysis of their socio-technical organization. Here, it is their net-
worked character which is important and it is here that we turn to ANT. In
short, while we think there is much potential in Bourdieu’s deployment of the
concept of field, his actual conceptualization of the role of technology as a
possible source of capital remains under-developed, and seems to hark back to
older notions of artisanal craft skills.
5. Socio-technical networks
The journey from Bourdieu to the ANT is certainly not commonly made and,
indeed, might be seen as a perverse route to take since ANT identifies its
opposition to structural sociological accounts of inequality while Bourdieu
has been widely used to enhance such accounts, specifically in class analysis.
Nonetheless, we suggest that the presumption of opposition between the
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two perspectives might be more to do with popular/dominant interpretations
of both Bourdieu and ANT, which have tended to emphasize particular readings
of each argument. Alternatively, in what follows, we want to draw attention to
some basic complementarities between the two approaches which we believe
might offer some promising ways forward in understanding digital social
inequality. We begin however by picking up where we left off in our discussion
of Bourdieu above, with the question of the technology itself – more specifi-
cally, the artefacts and devices that constitute particular technological
formations such as the web.
A foundational principle for ANT is that we cannot conceive of a social world
independent from the material world. The social is always material, as Latour
(1991) argues:
We are never faced with objects or social relations. We are faced with chains
which are associations of humans . . . and non-humans . . . power is not a
property of any of these elements but of a chain.
(Latour 1991, p. 110)
It is important not to understate the radical nature of this claim. Objects are not
marginal to human existence, and nor is it a one-way relation, whereby humans
produce artefacts, but rather ANT suggests that our world is at once composed
of human and non-human actors and that the non-human shapes what the
human becomes just as much as the other way around. In the context of this
paper, then, technologies exercise effects that are not only socially constructed,
they are not only what we – as human actors – make them (although this is impor-
tant) but have their own capacities and effects, and shape what we can become.
This is important because it means that we must pay attention to the qualities,
characteristics and agencies of particular technologies rather than making general-
ized claims about technology per se. However, for ANT, these qualities do not
inhere in particular technologies in any objective sense, but are produced as
objects come into relations with other actors in particular networks, echoing
points made by feminist theory, above. From this perspective, what we call ‘the
web’ is the outcome of a network of heterogeneous actors – servers, protocols,
users, websites, fibre optic cables and so on – none of which has an independent
existence outside the networks of which it is part. It follows then that this is a
performative theory – again, echoing both feminist and Bourdieusian theory.
Particular socio-technical networks persist in so much as they continue to be
enacted. Networks are held together by repetition of the practices that produce
them. Furthermore, because there is nothing essential that pre-exists the
network, it is only in performance of the network that entities are produced:
Technologies, knowledges and work may be understood as the effects of
materially, socially and conceptually hybrid performances. In these
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performances, different elements assemble together and act in certain ways
to produce specific outcomes.
(Law & Singleton 2000, p. 774)
Thus, what we might see as the social becomes, in this way of thinking, a
‘temporarily stabilized effect’ of heterogeneous networks or associations (Law
2008, p. 634). In this formulation, nothing is fixed or certain:
Power is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock or a capacity
that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and domination have
to be produced, made up, composed. Asymmetries exist, yes, but [the
question is] where do they come from and what are they made out of?
(Latour 2005, p. 63)
This formulation has points in common with the critique of what might be
termed ‘variable’ based accounts. Gilbert, in this issue, shows how it is necessary
to move beyond demographic accounts of the digital divide, which reifies notions
such as race and gender as if they were ontological ‘things’ and to see these
instead as social processes.
Now let us elaborate a little further on the points of contact between ANT
and Bourdieu, which we have begin to intimate above. Specifically, both are con-
cerned to avoid pre-determined notions of social category or relations between
actors, emphasising instead that what counts is process and action: it is through
these that outcomes – categories or effects – are produced. For Bourdieu, social
inequality is understood as the outcome of mobilization and position taking by
diverse actors, rather than in terms of social categories which are pre-defined
and act as social entities. The formation of social groups, such as social
classes, it then the product of practices, and – just as ANT argues – might
be seen as a ‘temporarily stabilized effect’ of heterogeneous networks or associ-
ations (Law 2008, p. 634). For ANT, there are no social groups, per se, only
group formation (Latour 2005), which means that:
The choice is clear: either we follow social theorists and begin our travel by
setting up at the start which kind of group and level of analysis we will focus
on, or we follow the actors’ own ways and begin our travels [with] the traces
left behind by their activity of forming and dismantling groups.
(p. 29)
Here, ‘actors’ own ways’ are not determined by pre-existing social relations but
rather it is these actions that are understood to produce both the actors
themselves and wider social formations. These radically anti-essentialist foundations
mean tracing networks and phenomena in particular case-studies to see effects,
rather than assuming pre-existing social categories or processes. This emphasizes
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the value of empirical investigation over categorical debate (Suchman 2007, p. xii)
insisting that abstraction must come from the concrete, rather assuming that we can
understand the concrete by beginning with abstraction. Thus, Latour argues that we
may continue to talk about class, capital etc., where we are looking at established
networks with some proven durability which have already produced these outcomes.
Terms such as class, gender and race may capture well enough relations of
domination in what has already been assembled – in stable networks – but do
not ‘. . . work so well to collect anew the participants in what is not – not yet –
a sort of social relation’ (Latour 2005, p. 12). But, he argues:
. . . in situations where innovations proliferate, where group boundaries are
uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account fluctuates, the
sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors new associations. At
this point, the last thing to do would be to limit in advance the shape, size,
heterogeneity and combination of associations.
This means that we can only see class, etc. as the outcome of specific networks.
We should not ask questions about class– for example – in advance of our
empirical research because ‘it’ does not exist outside the networks that may –
or may not – produce this particular social outcome. Again, this has striking
similarities with Bourdieu’s own observations:
The capacity for bringing into existence in an explicit state, . . . of making
public (i.e. objectified, visible, sayable, even official) that which, not yet
having obtained objective and collective existence, remained in a state of
individual or serial existence. . .. Represents a formidable social power,
that of bringing into existence groups by establishing . . . the explicit consen-
sus of the whole group.
(quoted in Weininger 2004, p. 132)
Bourdieu here avoids a substantialist definition of social entities, and is quite open
to the suggestion that the boundaries and nature of such groups are open to
contestation.
Here, we might suggest that Latour’s emphasis that class (etc) was not
important in innovatory situations is a somewhat contrived analytical contrast,
since it misses the way that innovations always take place in historical context
in which they emerge out of more durable formations.
Both Latour and Bourdieu, in somewhat different ways, explore the potential
accumulations of effects from multiple networks, or say how effects from one
network might feed into the operations of another. Class, for example, may be
an outcome of a number of networks within the fields of education, the labour
market, work organizations, etc. – depending on how class is defined. We
might see class as a form of ‘crystallization’ of such heterogeneous networks.
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Therefore, the arguments of ANT about socio-technical relations need not
be pitched as a critique of the sociology of stratification. To the contrary, we
suggest that there is analytical space for examining inequalities in established/
durable networks, and through seeking to develop more worked-through
examples of how ANT might contribute to our understanding of these
entrenched inequalities. This said, ANT’s relegation of inequality to durable,
established networks undermines its ability to grasp inequalities in emergent,
innovative and fluid or short-term networks and this requires more thought.
As Law (2008) himself has argued recently from within ANT perspective, we
need to understand how domination might operate in ‘non-coherent structures’:
There is . . . a sensibility to inequality that we have not yet quite managed to
articulate. That is that domination is often not a system effect, the
consequence of a coherent order. Rather it is a result of non-coherence.
Of elements of structuring, ordering, than only partially hang together.
Of relations of subordination that are relatively invulnerable precisely
because they are not tightly connected. Invulnerable because one is pulled
down the others are not pulled down with it.
(Law 2008, p. 641)
6. Discussion and conclusions
With these reflections in mind, how might we develop our understanding of the
relationship between technology and social inequality? First, to repeat ourselves,
we need to avoid reifying technology, as if it can be defined as an objective entity
which has independent causal powers. To be sure, we must understand technol-
ogies as actors – not reducible to social construction alone – but they become
actors in socio-technical networks, not on their own. Secondly, and related to
this, the issue is not to consider how those with access (hardware and the
skills to use it effectively) to a technology exploit or gain advantage over
those without such access. This also imparts objective properties to technology
itself: having ‘it’ alone is enough. Rather we should instead consider how tech-
nologies are associated with the crystallization of social relations of different
kinds, in which they generate capacities for making social relations durable,
enduring and thus able to store and accumulate practices and activities of
various kinds (Latour 1991).
There are several ways in which this idea can be developed. One possibility is
to follow Judith Butler’s injunction to follow Foucault’s archaeological method
(see Halford et al. (2010) for an extended account of this argument). Focussing
at the discursive level, Butler argues that our first task should be to trace the
knowledge/power relations that establish ‘a set of subtle and explicit criteria
for thinking about the world’ (Butler 2004, p. 215) so that we can ‘grasp what
9 5 0 I N F ORMAT I ON , COMMUN I CAT I ON & SOC I E T Y
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ha
lf
or
d,
 S
us
an
] 
At
: 
14
:3
7 
28
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
10
constitutes acceptability within the system’ (Foucault 1997, p. 53). In other words
– in thinking about technology and inequality – we must trace the particular
knowledge/power relations that establish the hegemonic norms of gender (or
race, class, age, sexuality and so on) and technology in particular contexts.
Second, we should be attentive to the breaking points in this: ‘the moments of
its discontinuities and the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility it prom-
ises’ (Butler 2004, p. 216). In short, we need to understand:
. . . how the terms of gender are instituted, naturalized and established as
pre-suppositional but [also] to trace the moments where the binary
system of gender is disrupted and challenged, where the coherence of the
categories are put into question, and where the very social life of gender
turns out to be malleable and transformable.
(Butler 2004, p. 216)
This approach keeps differentiation and inequality in play as non-essential,
dynamic and performative, emphasising possibilities for new configurations
without losing focus on the repetitive practices of gender, class, race and so
on within powerful regulatory norms. Both Butler (2004) and Haraway
(1997) emphasize a notion of the heterotopic in the everyday, that:
. . . the shapes the world takes are conventional and revisable, if also emi-
nently solid and full of consequences for un-equally distributed chances of
life and death
(Haraway 1997, p. 269)
This takes us far from Latour’s (2005) concerns about the use of terms such as
gender, class or race. In sharp contrast to his characterization of the ways in
which such terms are used, it does not suggest ‘functionalist accounts appealing
in a tired old way to pre-formed categories of the social such as race, gender and
class’ (Haraway 1997, p. 35) but rather validates the work of critical anti-racist,
feminist and class-aware scholars in exploring racial formation, gender-in-the-
making, the forging of class, the discursive production of sexuality and so on.
We can begin to see how this might work in analysing digital social inequalities
in Boltanski’s (1985) study of Cadres, whose aim is to show how technical skills
and competences can be taken up as part of the identities of durable social groups
– in his case, the French managerial classes. Through this means, the socio-cul-
tural formation of a distinctive group is itself dependent not only on political
organization but also on the capacity to mobilize technical skills. Patrick Joyce
(2010) has made a related argument about the way that the British upper class
was defined though its ‘administrative’ habitus, dependent critically on its
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capacity to read and write fluently. Hence, rather than the assumption that pre-
formed social groups ‘use’ (or do not use) technologies, we can identify a more
complex process of mutual interaction and stabilization. This kind of perspective
would indicate the potential of reflecting on how technical identities – such as
the computer ‘nerd’, the technically incompetent manager, and the like –
also embed social distinctions and inequalities.
Developing this perspective would address how other social groups are orga-
nized through these kinds of the mobilizations. Here again, the focus is not on iden-
tifying which groups are ‘left out’, of the reach of certain technologies, but rather
how they can be organized in marginal ways. Issues such as the way that technologi-
cal forms differentially involve the organization of repair, maintenance activities,
their relationship to the developers of the technology, as well as how technologies
are implicated in differentiating consumers and producers, are all subjects for ripe
analysis. Modern ICT increasingly bundles expertise into the design of code, to
seek to allow a wide range of consumers’ reasonable ease of use, thus appearing
to create an open flat field of undifferentiated social consumers, who stand in con-
trast to technical ‘experts’ such as software engineers and programmers. ICT thus
becomes deployed into complex relational identities in which managers, experts,
users and consumers are constructed in pervasive ways.
It is well known that social differentiations are routinely generated through
the processing of consumers through sorting algorithms which prioritize and
differentiate, though in ways which are often covert and do not draw attention
to themselves. Whereas the traditional bank manager was a public figure of
authority who drew upon his masculinity and respectability as part of the judge-
ment-making process, credit scoring methods hide social indicators of this kind
(Halford et al. 1997). In this way, the coding of social relations can appear to
reduce the visibility of hierarchical social groups. Yet, just as Burrows and
Gane (2005) have shown that software helps generate class inequalities
through encouraging people with certain common properties to cluster together
using ICT devices, so we need to more critically reflect on how social differen-
tiations can be generated by specific kinds of information system. Here, the
arguments of MacKenzie (2007) regarding the way that those in the financial
trade mobilize the ‘Black–Scholes’ formula, and through these technical
devices gained the potential to generate huge financial rewards, is an interesting
pointer of the possibilities of this perspective.
Once we open up the question of digital social inequalities in this way, we can
begin to see the scale of the agenda that we are setting ourselves and – at the same
time – how important it is that we address this agenda if we are to grasp the
evolving and socio-technical nature of inequality in contemporary societies.
We need new perspectives and new tools which will enable us to go beyond estab-
lished approaches to both technology and inequality and to find new ways of think-
ing, analysing and researching that get inside the complex and evolving nature of
digital social inequalities. All the papers in this special issue take up this challenge.
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Notes
1 For example, we note the personal hostility in France between ‘classic’
sociologists of inequality notably Pierre Bourdieu, on the one hand,
and those working in STS, such as Bruno Latour, on the other hand.
These two groups rarely engaged with each others’ work except
through sniping critique and snide asides. See notably Bourdieu’s dismis-
sive comments on Latour in Sociology of Science and Reflexivity and Latour’s
(2005) critique of Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field in Assembling
the Social.
2 There is some attention to the biased content of the web, specifically the
dominance of the English language, the operation of search engines, and
the fact that the vast majority of hits focus on a very small number of sites
produced by global corporations, e.g. the BBC, etc. However, in the
debate on digital inequality itself these points are heavily underplayed
in comparison with the question of effective use and there seems to be
an implicit assumption that the question of content will be fixed later.
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